Lack of transparency is dangerous; could lead to another conflict: Ayesha Siddiqa

Do you believe the ceasefire will hold?

Well, it seems that it will because there are now international players like the US, which wants Pakistan and India to have peace and not escalate further. I would argue that in the 76 years of our conflictual relationship, it has always been an international player who has engaged in de-escalating tensions. When this conflict started, one was wondering, where is that powerful third player? And it eventually kicked in. Donald Trump called, and now we have de-escalated. So it seems that the cycle has repeated itself.

President Donald Trump says the ceasefire was due to his mediation. Your Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has thanked him. The Indian side has said that there was no mediation. It has also been reported that Pakistan approached the US for an exit out of the cycle of hostility. Is this your understanding as well of how the ceasefire came to be?

Well, based here in the UK, one is hearing from the international media; if you look at the CNN story, it reads that both sides were interested. These claims and counterclaims are what we’ll see. This is what we’ve seen in the past as well. The important thing is that there was a de-escalation. I would say that as time goes on, we’ll probably get more information, more stories, and more contradictory statements will come out. Sadly, I would say that history seems to be repeating itself. Nothing substantial has changed. The important thing is that both countries are claiming victory. Both countries believe or are trying to tell their audience that it was the other side that wants de-escalation and, therefore, victory is theirs.

Speaking of the international press, Western media outlets reported that the US, which had earlier said this conflict was not its business, got involved after receiving some alarming intelligence. Would you agree the Indian attack on Chaklala was a turning point?

The other way of looking at it is that the attack wasn’t just Chaklala; it was on three bases. There was the Murid airbase in Chakwal and a third air force base in Shorkot. The other reports are that after that, Pakistan was ready to escalate further; once it went out of control, Pakistan would use any amount of force, which means conventional and nuclear. There were rumours of the Pakistani Prime Minister calling a meeting of the National Command Authority, which is responsible for nuclear decision-making.

Was this the alarming intelligence the US seems to have received?

I would imagine, yes. Until both sides were kind of using drones, missiles, firing at each other, the international community stood back. But once there was this fear that there was going to be a breakdown of deterrence, a possible breakdown, that’s when they came in and decided that shouldn’t be allowed to happen. There’s so much else going on around the world and you can’t have a nuclear war between two very important countries of South Asia.

What is your understanding of the damage the Indian Air Force has inflicted on air bases and other military assets in Pakistan?

The data is still short on both sides. The Pakistan Air Force has given details of the targets it hit. And on the Indian side, international commentators who work on geostrategy, who work on geopolitics are complaining that there is still a lack of data. Once that data comes out, it will be clearer. The Pakistan military’s claims are that there were missiles fired and drones fired by India and they were intercepted and didn’t do the damage they were supposed to do.

The airport has been shut down. I heard about repair work.

Yes, Rahim Yar Khan airport [in Pakistan’s Punjab province]. In fact, one of the claims [in the Indian media] was that the runway was flattened. Interestingly, that runway was used mainly by United Arab Emirates rulers who would come to Pakistan for hunting. The other is about Noor Khan airbase, in Chaklala. While claims were made and people heard explosions, life around that area was fairly normal. Also, some claims made by the Indian media, like Karachi port being attacked, didn’t prove correct.

So at this point in time, and during the conflict, one doesn’t know what claims were actually genuine ones made by the Indian military and claims made by the Indian media. So, the war was fought on two fronts. One was psychological warfare and the other was actual warfare.

Yesterday, somebody said, is it a battle? How do you define it? Now, the nature of munitions used makes it more than a battle. It was a war fought the same way as in Kargil; artillery was used, and the Air Force was used. So we’ve just fought a war. I mean, the only difference is that land forces did not engage. But short of that, it was a war that we fought.

India has said that Pakistan used a Chinese missile called PL-15, but Indian air defence systems intercepted and destroyed it. How many Chinese munitions and other weaponry did Pakistan use in this conflict? What is your sense of that?

For quite a while now, 70 to 80 per cent of Pakistan’s weaponry has been Chinese. Pakistan does use American F-16s as well. But its Air Force’s mainstay, for example, remains the Chinese JF-17 Thunder aircraft and J-10Cs. The Pakistani claim is that J-10Cs were used to down Indian Air Force planes, including a Rafale. CNN has said that at least one Indian Air Force Rafale was downed, and it was reportedly confirmed by French intelligence.

India has not officially confirmed or denied reports of this. They have said that all their pilots have come back.

Well, international commentators are saying India is not releasing any data. The story going around in the world is that the Rafales didn’t perform as well as the Chinese equipment. These are claims and counterclaims. Unless there’s more transparency to the data, more discussion… Probably in the next 15 days or a month, you will have more information coming from your side.

I think what’s important to understand here is that India probably had less time. In a conflict, it’s not just the machine; it’s also the man behind the machine. How much time have they spent with the Rafales? You just have two squadrons of Rafales, less time with them. Pakistan, on the other hand, has a more integrated and cosier relationship with its original equipment manufacturer, the Chinese. Pakistan exercises with them on a more regular basis because China is now the base for 80 per cent of Pakistani equipment. So they have had a lot of time. So, the interoperability between Pakistan, the end user, and the equipment manufacturer, the Chinese, is much deeper than in the case of India and France.

But let me repeat, unless there is greater transparency, we won’t be able to assess. I think in a way, holding back information is dangerous because that is likely to lead to another conflict. Because at one level, there is also psychological warfare happening. And psychological warfare is not just meant for the other side; it is meant for the support base at home as well. If the understanding in Pakistan is that we managed to do greater damage, then Pakistan, to its own understanding, will appear strong and vice versa. I think right now we don’t have an independent assessment. We need more data.

You talked about psychological warfare. What is the mood in Pakistan now?

Starting from the Pakistani Prime Minister making what sounded like a victory speech, I think it’s important to understand—there’ll constantly be the claims and counterclaims—that the man on the street is feeling excited. They feel they have managed to successfully push India back. The Pakistan Army, whose image was a bit of a problem—suddenly that problem is gone. [Pakistan Army Chief General] Asim Munir and his two service chiefs, definitely the air chief, are being viewed as heroes.

In India, there is a little bit of anger that India accepted a ceasefire. How has it gone down in Pakistan?

People are happy. Because nobody wants a war. The man on the street got two minutes of excitement. One of the targets was Bahawalpur. The madrasa was on the outskirts. People were shaken. There was pressure on the Pakistani military to respond. People had begun to murmur that the military or the government had been forced by the US or some international actor not to respond. So the military had pressure. This is the common man’s understanding—that there was an equal amount of pressure on the military to respond. And now that they have responded, they’re happy. And if you watch Pakistani media, including hawks like former High Commissioner [to India] Abdul Basit, who used to be very critical of American involvement in Pakistan’s affairs, suddenly everybody is thanking the Americans.

One of the things that Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, said was that after the ceasefire, the two sides would meet in a neutral place for talks. India has said there will be no talks except about the ceasefire and that they have agreed to nothing else and not to any neutral place. Are people in Pakistan expecting a peace dialogue to take place between India and Pakistan?

Pakistanis, I would argue, are just watching how India now deals with the US. Let’s not forget that when Donald Trump recently went around threatening and mentioned Indian toys [goods] as having high tariffs, India did try to reduce or withdraw tariffs on American products. India is a member of the Quad. There is supposed to be a much tighter relationship between the US and India. So, at this point in time, when on all other matters India takes the US fairly seriously, then I think from Pakistan’s perspective, it justifies their mood of feeling elated and victorious.

It’s a separate question whether ultimately both sides are going to sit down and actually talk about important issues behind this conflict. The very fact that Donald Trump has mentioned that he will get the Kashmir issue resolved means that they have managed to internationalise the Kashmir issue. I mean, there is an expectation in Washington that both sides will talk and there will be a bigger, comprehensive dialogue. It will include terrorism but will also include Kashmir. And we are back to, from Pakistan’s perspective, we are back to where we were prior to Article 370 [being abrogated].

India has, of course, denied that the US had anything to do with negotiating the ceasefire. It has also denied that there will be any talks at all. Instead, India has said that any future terrorist act from Pakistan will be seen as an act of war. Are people in Pakistan listening to this message that India has sent?

It’s like we’re looking at two different stories. What you’re telling me about India’s understanding of how this war has ended is very different from how it’s perceived in Pakistan, and of course different lessons. Historically, the wars that Pakistan started, it could not end using its military. But starting from 2016, the first surgical strike to the second surgical strike in 2019, and this one… it is not perceived internationally or in Pakistan as something that has come out with the success India was aiming for, that the other side would now understand. And in fact, one of the lessons is that India does not have the [conventional] military capacity to teach Pakistan a lesson. And actually, deterrence had kicked in. The threat of a nuclear escalation, of a conventional war turning into nuclear escalation, you know, resulted in the international community getting in.

Why do you not see this as India having conventional depth? Because India has pushed the envelope both times, in 2019 when it struck deep inside Pakistan in Balakot, in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and this time in Punjab and in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Several targets were on your side of Punjab. It was in Bahawalpur, in Sialkot, Lahore, outside Lahore, and Muridke. These were all within the conventional ambit.

Yes, but once you have struck inside, there is going to be a response. Has it managed to generate the fear that would snap relations between the militant leadership and the Pakistani establishment? Did it stop Pakistan from responding? Their [Pakistan’s] understanding is that India started a war to punish Pakistan, [but] it has actually ended up internationalising the Kashmir issue. Of course, that is India’s prerogative too. The point is that every time this happens, it strengthens Pakistan’s position or claim without giving India the edge.

How badly have the headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Muridke and the headquarters of the Jaish-e-Mohammed in Bahawalpur been hit? How permanent is the damage?

I can tell you about Bahawalpur. We are talking about a huge compound. A mosque was damaged. A women’s madrasa was damaged. And it’s not like they were huddling together under one roof. In fact, the news from Bahawalpur is that for the funeral of Masood Azhar’s family members, he was present. And you’ve probably seen photos of the funeral in Muridke, where the military was present. Senior military officials were present. Because of this conflict, there would be more sympathy.

But terrorism or using terrorist proxies in Kashmir is not the way forward. I mean, to be present at the funeral of people killed in that camp is to attend the funeral of members of a globally designated terrorist group. Why does this not create outrage within Pakistan?

See, before this conflict started, people had kind of stopped thinking about Kashmir. There were other matters, like politics, Imran Khan, economic crisis, etc. Now the Indian strike has brought people back to where they started; there is massive improvement in the military’s image, which means that now when resources are diverted, there will be fewer complaints. There’s the justification that India attacked. And thirdly, people will start talking about Kashmir. The sympathy around, for example, what the Pakistani military was doing in Balochistan to the ordinary Baloch will take a hit. My fear is that [the prospects for] political change inside Pakistan has, in a way, disappeared.

Did the attack in Pahalgam, the way it was done, separating Hindu men and then shooting them point-blank, shock Pakistan? Was there outrage over this incident?

I think where the Pakistani establishment has succeeded is in convincing ordinary people, who on a daily basis are not in touch with Lashkar or Jaish. It’s not the ordinary people. Those days are over when there used to be open recruitment. I mean, we’ve seen the times when they would have their collection boxes in bazaars in very visible places. That’s gone. I am sure they would talk about jihad and about Kashmir, but nobody was joining them or going to fight. So my argument is that ordinary people in Pakistan are not now familiar in that way with these groups.

You are saying that people are not making the connection between the Pahalgam incident and India’s strikes on Pakistani soil?

No, they’re not. The Indian side is convinced there is a Pakistani hand. On the Pakistani side, the understanding is India failed to provide any evidence. It’s a separate debate from earlier on, for example, in Mumbai, where Ajmal Kasab was caught. Or other incidents where there was evidence shared, and yet Pakistan didn’t do anything about it. For the ordinary Pakistani, in Pahalgam, something tragic happened, and immediately—and that is where I would say the Indian media has a role to play—within five minutes of the attack, they started talking about Pakistan and completely diluted the fact. The Indian government was more thoughtful and responsible and took greater time in naming Pakistan. The media jumped in too soon. In fact, now the Pakistani people can’t make a difference between the Indian media and the Indian government. The Indian media played its hand much less responsibly. These are critical strategic matters; it should follow the government much more patiently.

How have last week’s hostilities impacted General Asim Munir’s leadership? He was very unpopular earlier.

He’s the hero today. More than General Asim Munir, it’s the military which has recovered its image. Earlier, people would say they can’t fight; they’re into businesses; they can’t defend themselves. Now they’re saying, look, we performed. Some people sympathetic to Imran Khan say this is a time when Munir should get Imran Khan out of jail and have a partnership with him. But why would Asim Munir do it now? He suddenly doesn’t need Imran Khan for his popularity. Munir is no longer worried about his image.

Right before the war started, there was a conflict going on between Punjab and Sindh over construction of six canals on the Indus, which was kind of generating a lot of anger. Those people in Sindh are no longer talking about this. What Pakistan has managed to do successfully also is to tell them that, look, yes, we have a water problem, but now India is adding to that problem by holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance. That’s where your anger should be directed, not us.